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The Opportunities and Challenges of Internet of Things Evidence 
































As internet-connected devices become more prevalent, the need for police and law 
enforcement to be able to utilize these devices when solving crimes steadily increases. Law 
enforcement agencies are already aware of the opportunities and challenges when interacting 
with computers and mobile cellular devices, but many agencies are unable to utilize these 
avenues of evidence because of limited access to resources able to forensically examine 
computing devices. In addition, the introduction of internet of things devices, such as Amazon 
Alexa and other microphone or camera connected devices, allows new opportunities for law 
enforcement agencies to gather digital forensic evidence either to convict a criminal or to solve a 
crime. This study will explore both the opportunities and challenges of using Internet of Things 
evidence for law enforcement purposes by analyzing Internet of Things legal cases as well as 
articles and research about the Internet of Things and digital evidence. 
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As internet-connected devices become more prevalent, the need for police and law 
enforcement to be able to utilize these devices when solving crimes steadily increases (NNECV, 
2018). Law enforcement agencies are already aware of the opportunities and challenges when 
interacting with computers and mobile cellular devices, but many agencies are unable to utilize 
these forms of evidence because of limited access to resources needed to forensically examine 
computing devices. In addition, the introduction of internet of things devices, such as Amazon 
Alexa and other microphone or camera connected devices, allows new opportunities for law 
enforcement agencies to gather digital forensic evidence either to convict a criminal or to solve a 
crime. 
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a growing market, with new devices released and new 
applications found every month. With an estimated 38.5 billion IoT devices globally in both 
personal and industrial applications (Lillis et al., 2015), the IoT has huge potential for law 
enforcement and forensics. Intel defines the Internet of Things as “billions of ‘smart’ devices— 
from minuscule chips to mammoth machines—that use wireless technology to talk to each other 
(and to us)” ("Data Center Solutions, IoT, and PC Innovation", n.d.). As the number of IoT 
devices increase, the presence of IoT devices in criminal investigations will increase as well. As 
of June 2019, 66% of homes had at least one IoT device, with 25% of homes having more than 
one (Zurkus, 2019). The NPR spring Smart Audio Report estimates that 24% of adults over 18 
own at least one smart speaker, the most recognizable of which is the amazon Echo (Edison 
Research, 2020). The increasing numbers of IoT devices in households opens up a number of 
opportunities for law enforcement investigators. However, there are a number of logistical 
challenges and legal challenges that investigators will face. This report will explore the 
opportunities presented by IoT evidence and examine the legal and logistical challenges faced by 
investigators. 
All IoT evidence is under the banner of Digital Evidence. Digital evidence is defined as 
information and data of value to an investigation that is stored on, received or transmitted by an 
electronic device (National Institute of Justice, 2008). Thus, it is important to consider that all 
legal and logistical challenges faced when using digital evidence applies to IoT evidence as well. 
In this study, this paper will use the Intel definition of Internet of Things. Intel defines 
the Internet of Things as “billions of ‘smart’ devices—from minuscule chips to mammoth 
machines—that use wireless technology to talk to each other (and to us)” ("Data Center 
Solutions, IoT, and PC Innovation", n.d.). While this includes all internet connected devices, 
from coffee makers and thermostats to computers and cell phones, this paper will be focusing on 
evidence that is not based on internet traffic. Rather , this study will focus on records from the 
devices themselves, such as position data. 
 
 
Cases Using Digital Evidence 
Before entering into an analysis of the opportunities and challenges present with IoT 
evidence, it is important to establish that this evidence is being used in cases today - and that the 
numbers of IoT cases are only going to increase (NNECV, 2018). The following cases establish 
both the relevance of IoT evidence and give examples on how IoT evidence can be used. 
Arkansas vs Bates (Case No. 2016-370-2) was a murder investigation in Bentonville, 
Arkansas. The defendant, James. A. Bates, owned an Amazon Echo device that was close 
enough to the site of the murder (a hot tub) to potentially hear incriminating information. The 
investigating police served Amazon with a warrant for any audio recordings or transcriptions the 
Echo had captured in the 48 hours around the murder. The authorities also asked for the 
subscriber and account info for the owner of the echo ("State v. Bates", 2017). Amazon 
produced the latter, but filed a motion challenging the warrant, citing first amendment concerns. 
Amazon claimed that the “interactions may constitute expressive content that implicates privacy 
concerns and First Amendment protections” ("Memorandum of law in support of Amazon's 
motion to quash search warrant", 2017). Amazon dropped its opposition to producing the data 
after the defendant authorized the release of the data ("State v. Bates", 2017). 
Two days of Amazon Echo records were requested in a double murder case in New 
Hampshire. Two women, Christine Sullivan and Jenna Pellegrini, were stabbed to death in their 
home. Judge Steven Houran wrote, “The court finds there is probable cause to believe the 
server[s] and/or records maintained for or by Amazon.com contain recordings made by the Echo 
smart speaker from the period of January 27, 2017 to January 29, 2017, and that such 
information contains evidence of crimes committed against Ms. Sullivan, including the attack 
and possible removal of the body from the kitchen” (Cuthbertson, 2018). In this case, voice 
identification is a possibility, as well as a more effective time lining of the crime. 
Amazon Echo records have been requested as recently as 2019 in a case in Florida. 
 
During an altercation with her boyfriend Adam Crespo, victim Silvia Galva was stabbed in the 
chest with a spear. Crespo claimed that Galva grabbed the spear and the spear snapped, stabbing 
Galva in the chest (Trischitta, 2019). Police believed that Alexa may have accidentally been 
activated during the attack, and will have recorded key audio from the event. This audio could 
be the key to determining the truthfulness of Crespo’s story ("Alexa, did he do It?", 2019). 
Data from health-related apps have been used in a number of cases as well. In one Ohio 
case, a man was convicted of Arson based in part on data from his pacemaker. In this case, a 
cardiologist testified that the defendant’s story, which involved a large amount of physical 
activity in a short time, did not match up with the records of his heart activity ("Pacemaker data 
used in court", 2017). 
Fitbit data in Connecticut was essential in disproving the timeline given by the suspect. 
Richard Dabate, accused of killing his wife, initially told investigators that she was shot by a 
masked assailant as she entered their home. However, Fitbit data show that she moved around 
for at least an hour and walked about 1200 ft after she returned home - much more than the 125 
feet from the car to the location Dabate claimed she was killed in (Lartey, 2017). 
In Germany, a health app was used in another rape and murder case to show the similarity 
between a defendant’s recorded activity the night of the murder and the likely movements of the 
attacker. Hussain Khavari was accused of raping and murdering Maria Ladenburge and then 
dumping her body in the river. Authorities managed to determine that the bulk of Khavari’s 
activities the day of the murder consisted of climbing stairs. They compared this data with data 
of a reconstruction of the potential movements of the attacker when disposing of the body, and 
found a strong correlation between the health data and the movements of the attacker (Jordan, 
2018). 
Health data from Apple watches were instrumental in proving pharmacist Mitesh Patel 
murdered his wife Jessica. Patel had initially staged the scene to look like a burglar had killed 
his wife. However, the health data showed that Mitesh had moved around his house rapidly in 
the minutes around his wife’s death, while his wife had remained still except for 14 feet of 
movement when her murderer moved her body to stage the scene (Parveen, 2018). 
In San Jose California, a Fitbit was used to show that a murder victim perished during the 
time period that her step grandfather was in the house. Anthony Aello took his stepdaughter a 
pizza as he visited her house, and left shortly thereafter. Five days later, the body of Karen 
Nevarra was found in the home. Data from her Fitbit showed a spike in heart rate during the 
visit, then a rapid slowing of heartbeat until it ceased five minutes before the step grandfather left 
the house (Hauser, 2018). 
In Australia, Apple watch health data showed inconsistencies in the story of Caroline 
Nillson, accused of murdering her grandmother. Nillson claimed that her grandmother was 
killed by a group of men, and she herself was then tied up before they left. Neighbors called the 
police when Nillson left the house bound and gagged around 10 pm. However, Apple watch data 
recorded her grandmother’s death at 6:45 pm ("Apple watch Provides murder case clues", 2018). 
Not all IoT data has led to convictions or been used properly. In Denmark, as many as 32 
prisoners were released after flaws in the method used to collect geolocation data was uncovered 
("Trods Tvivl om teledata", 2019). The system linked locations to cell phone towers. Reporter 
John Henley wrote that “the system also linked phones to the wrong masts, connected them to 
several towers at once, sometimes hundreds of kilometers apart, recorded the origins of text 
messages incorrectly and got the location of specific towers wrong” (Henley, 2019). As a result 
of these flaws, innocents were implicated in crimes and potential criminals were excluded from 
investigations (Henley, 2019). 
In 2011, Casey Anthony was acquitted in the murder of her daughter despite strong 
physical evidence due to mishandling of computer records. Investigators presented incorrect 
data, which came to light during the court trial, and completely missed 95% of the search history 









IoT devices come in many different forms, with many different types of data recorded. 
 
This presents a number of opportunities for investigators, with vast amounts of data for analytics, 
up to a data point every six seconds per household (Tran, 2017). Each subset of device can be 
used to track and investigate specific types of crime. Gaming consoles, for example, can be used 
to track suspicious internet activity (Richter, 2013). While a suspect may be very careful with 
internet history on a personal computer, they may not take the same precautions on a gaming 
console. As a result, evidence from the console can be used to link a suspect to suspicious 
activity. Game consoles have been used as evidence for child pornography and child rape cases 
("Data Center Solutions, IoT, and PC Innovation", n.d.). 
Another potential source of information is the Amazon Echo Device. The Amazon Echo 
records all queries asked of it, including recordings taken by mistake. Author Lee Reibel likened 
the presence of an Echo to be “Almost like your room is bugged” ("Not only can alexa 
Eavesdrop—She can also testify against you", 2019). Accidental recordings are available both in 
user logs and through Amazon, and can provide audio recordings of a crime ("Not only can alexa 
Eavesdrop—She can also testify against you", 2019). 
Fitness trackers, like the popular Fitbit smartwatch, can be used in criminal cases as well. 
Fitness trackers and apps often record location data and can be used to track a person in the real 
world (Myers, 2015). Health data can further be used to determine impulsivity, drug use, alcohol 
use, and sleeping patterns (Tran, 2017). Other potential applications are time of death 
determinations ("Not only can alexa Eavesdrop—She can also testify against you", 2019) and 
checking to see if a given alibi matches physical data like heart rate for the alibi activity. 
Other IoT devices that have forensic applications include smart refrigerators, thermostats, 
TVs, and bikes or cars. Activity from smart fridges and thermostats can be used to determine 
when someone was in the house, and any smart device, including smart TVs, that include 
microphones can be used as a potential wiretap by remotely accessing and turning the 
microphone on (FBI Portland, 2019). Position data from smart bikes and cars can be tracked 
both to find a suspect and to find a stolen vehicle (Fitzgerald & Kelly, 2016)(Morris, 2014). 
Occupancy sensors in dorms have the potential to be used to find large parties which may be 
useful in investigating sexual assaults (Morris, 2014). Smart parking lot systems could be used 
both in a preventative and in a forensic manner as well by recording vehicles in the lot and 









IoT evidence is evidence, and must be treated as such. This leads to a number of legal 
issues and gray areas. An example of this is what information is covered by warrants and what is 
considered plain view evidence (RAND corporation, 2015). IoT evidence often contains 
personal information and personally sensitive files, which need to be properly handled (RAND 
corporation, 2015). This means that any sensitive files must be stored securely and access 
limited to avoid leaks of sensitive information to malicious cyberattacks on investigating 
departments. 
There are also a number of search and seizure issues regarding IoT evidence. The device 
and the data can be seen as both one piece of evidence and two pieces of evidence. The entire 
device and the data on it is technically one item, but the device and the data on it are often so 
different that they need to be approached as two separate pieces of evidence. This can easily 
lead to confusion on how to handle the device (RAND corporation, 2015). In addition to the 
above problem, the plain view doctrine, which allows an officer to seize evidence not covered by 
a warrant if said evidence is both in plain view and he has probable cause to believe the evidence 
is connected to a crime ("Plain view doctrine", n.d.), is unclear for IoT and digital evidence. 
While searching for evidence of one illegal activity, a forensic specialist can easily come across 
another. Some courts rule that such evidence is not considered in plain view, while others take 
the position that all evidence found on a device is plain view evidence (RAND corporation, 
2015). One solution to this issue is to use third party investigators that will only send evidence 
relevant to the case to the legal authorities, and destroy the rest (RAND corporation, 2015). 
Another issue with digital evidence is how to maintain a proper evidence chain. The 
documentation can be difficult for evidence that is not physically present, and this can lead to 
admissibility issues in court (RAND corporation, 2015). IoT and Digital evidence can 
authentication problems without the proper experts presenting on the testimony, as it is possibly 
to falsify electronic records. Electronic evidence must be authenticated before it can be used, 
and an expert on how the data was created is necessary to ensure accuracy of the evidence and 
explain its meaning. This is an extension of the silent witness theory, which states that “when an 
adequate foundation is provided to assure the accuracy of the process producing a photograph, 
the photograph can be admitted to speak for itself, even though no witness has vouched for its 
accuracy” (US legal, n.d.). As IoT evidence can be difficult and time consuming to procure and 
explain, IoT evidence can be difficult to show to the legal defense team as well, leading to delays 









Unfortunately, there are many logistical problems with IoT evidence. Some problems 
that have been identified are an increase in size and complexity of digital evidence, a lack of 
standards for data collection, differing physical characteristics of devices, and different methods 
of data storage (Kruger & Venter, 2019). The RAND corporation agrees with many of these 
issues, specifically mentioning that there is too much evidence and too little support or budget. 
RAND further mention issues with jurisdictional boundaries, as evidence may be on servers 
across state or national boundaries (RAND corporation, 2015). A 2016 study pointed to the 
increase in number of devices, increase in cases in which those devices are pertinent, and 
increase in data gathered from each device as issues law enforcement agencies face - in some 
cases, these difficulties led to suppression of the evidence (Lillis et al., 2015). The 2016 study 
further laid out five major challenges: Complexity of evidence, diversity in devices and a lack of 
techniques to address this, issues with correlating data to the case, volume of data, and difficulty 
in unified time lining of data gathered from devices (Lillis et al., 2015). There is less certainty in 
the method used to store the data - data can be stored on the device, on a data center or hub, or 
virtually in the cloud (Lillis et al., 2015). For many agencies, state and federal support is critical 
in mitigating these issues (RAND corporation, 2015). Many of these problems have already 








One major influence on IoT evidence is the laws regarding its use. The RAND 
corporation identified four laws regarding Digital evidence: the Wiretap Act , the Pen Registers 
and Trap and Trace Device Statute , the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, and the Privacy 
Protection Act (RAND corporation, 2015). These laws cover IoT evidence as a subset of digital 
evidence. 
The Wiretap act, 18 U.S. Code § 2511, protects the privacy of communications by two 
parties from nonconsensual outside interception (8 U.S. Code § 2511). This has the potential to 
apply to IoT evidence, specifically using IoT devices as microphones inside of a residence or 
vehicle. However, it is worth noting that agreeing to the terms of service of many devices, such 
as the Amazon Echo, gives consent to the provider to record conversations and other data 
("Alexa terms of Use", 2020). Section 2 Subsection D of 18 U.S. Code § 2511 further allows a 
person party to the communication to intercept as well, which could allow the service provider 
access as well. Furthermore, per 18 U.S.C. § 2518 warranted wiretaps are not prohibited. 
The Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Device Statute, 18 U.S.C. §3121 et seq, covers the 
collection of metadata from devices, rather than the content of the communication. This includes 
data such as email and phone numbers (18 U.S. Code chapter 119). 
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act , 18 U.S.C. §2701 et seq., prevents 
providers from providing sensitive data to law enforcement agencies without a subpoena or 
warrant (RAND corporation, 2015)(18 U.S. Code chapter 119). This applies to IoT evidence 
such as Amazon Echo recordings. For example, in the case an investigator needs Echo 
recordings, they would need to subpoena Amazon for the recordings for Amazon to be able (or 
willing) to provide them. 
The Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000aa et seq, prevents the disclosure of 
sensitive unpublished information, such as the manuscript for a book, from being disseminated 
(RAND corporation, 2015) (661. privacy Protection act of 1980). This law has been used by 
Amazon to attempt to prevent Amazon Echo records from being subpoenaed ("Memorandum of 
law in support of Amazon's motion to quash search warrant", 2017). 
It is important to note that court rulings, also known as case law, would normally have a 
huge impact on IoT law as well. However, at this moment, IoT cases have not been heard in 
higher courts, preventing case law precedence at this time. Thus, investigators and courts are 









Although it is possible to examine the opportunities and challenges of IoT devices 
through literature, any conclusions gathered must be confirmed by examining the first hand 
experiences of criminal investigators through interviews of law enforcement personnel. 
 
 
This Project will answer the following questions: 
 
RSQ1: How can law enforcement officers use IoT devices to gather evidence for law 
enforcement agencies? 
RSQ2: How can law enforcement officers better understand the legal challenges associated with 
using IoT evidence? 
RSQ3: How can law enforcement officers better understand the operational challenges with 
using IoT evidence and other digital forensics? 
To answer these questions, insights from seven interviews, case law studies, and prior 
research will be combined to create a document that will be a comprehensive and helpful 
overview in how best to use the IoT as a law enforcement officer. The interviews focus on how 
digital forensics is used in the context of the interviewee, as well as the reasons that the 
interviewee does not or is not able to get or use more forensic evidence. Interviewees are from 
city, county, and national law enforcement agencies. The interviews cover the role of digital 
forensics in the agency, the processes involved in using the forensic, the procedures used, the 
resources the agencies have access to, and the waiting time for digital forensics evidence to be 
processed. Interviewees were chosen from a list compiled by Professor Stone and from 
recommendations from interviewees. The interview questions are below: 
RQ1: Determine how law enforcement agencies have used IoT evidence, or failing that Digital 
evidence. 
1. Question: From your perspective, what types of criminal activities produce digital 
evidence? 
 
2. Question: Can you walk me through an example of how your organization uses IoT or 
digital evidence in cases? 
 
Possible probes: If digital evidence is not used in cases, what is preventing you from 
using IoT evidence? Was IoT or digital evidence critical in securing convictions How did 
digital evidence ensure a conviction in these cases? 
 
RQ2: Determine the operational challenges faced when using digital evidence. 
 
3. Question: Can you walk me through a time that you processed digital evidence for a 
case? 
 
4. Question: How prepared did you feel for this experience? 
 
Possible probes: Do you have the resources and/or training necessary to process digital 
evidence yourself? If you do not have the resources necessary, what resources are you 
lacking? What would be a good step in securing those resources? 
5. Question: Do you know of any outside resources to process digital evidence? If not, 
what would the ideal outside resources look like? 
 
Possible Probes: What are the pros and cons of those resources? 
 
RQ3: Determine if digital evidence has faced any legal challenges. 
 




Each interview was transcribed and relevant data was annotated by relevant research 
question. The annotations were then into sections by research question. Themes were identified 
for each of the research question and the data was further organized by categories and 
subcategories based on the themes identified and the frequency of the data points found. Finally, 
the resulting hierarchy was analyzed and conclusions drawn from the data. This analysis is 
consistent with standard methods of transcript analysis of long interviews (Canary, 2019)("How 
to analyze an interview Transcript: 6 steps for qualitative analysis.", 2021)(Deferera, 2014). The 
results are collected in three sections corresponding with each research question. Each section 
details the conclusions found from the interview data. These conclusions are then compared to 
the results found in the case and legal analysis section . Finally, each research question is 
analyzed and the overall results, from both the interviews and the research section, are compiled. 
 
 




It was discovered earlier that there are a huge number of opportunities for law 
enforcement agencies to use IoT evidence. This holds true throughout the interviews as well. 
One of the major themes in the interviews was the amount of digital and IoT evidence in criminal 
cases. Most of the interviewees stated that almost every criminal activity puts forth some kind of 
digital or IoT evidence. Some devices specifically mentioned to be especially likely to be in 
evidence included cell phones and routers. Although not all of that evidence is useful, as a 
number of cases either do not need it or are not important enough that the work needed to get 
digital evidence is worth it, already the majority of cases will leave digital evidence. 
Although every cases leaves some sort of digital evidence, not every case uses digital or 
IoT evidence. Despite this, a number of areas where digital evidence and IoT evidence is often 
used were identified. First, internet based cases obviously included digital evidence. These 
cases involve anything from stalking, harassment, child pornography, and terrorism cases to 
financial crimes, like investment fraud. The most likely non-internet based cases to use digital or 
IoT evidence were violent crimes and sexual crimes, especially sexual crimes against children. 
Violent crimes include but are not limited to murder, home invasion, assault, and robbery. 
Property crimes were identified as likely to have digital evidence as well. Other crimes 
mentioned included human trafficking and kidnapping. 
Also included in the findings from the interviews are the broad variety of avenues to get 
and use evidence and the broad variety of types of evidence. The most common type of digital 
evidence mentioned were cell phones and cell phone evidence. This evidence includes texting 
records and call records, website traffic records, and photo evidence. Text records, both from 
standard messaging service and from other venues such as Facebook, Snapchat, and Instagram, 
often include incriminating information, some of which is as good as a confession. Internet 
records can show websites visited, which is important for financial and sexual crimes. Photo 
evidence, while invaluable in child exploration cases, can also include images of stolen goods 
and other incriminating evidence. Metadata from these images can sometimes allow officers to 
find the exact date, time, and location of when the photo was taken. Another commonly used 
avenue of cell phone evidence is GPS evidence. GPS data from the phone can show the 
movement of the suspect, and can be used to determine their location at the time of the crime and 
in some cases where the body might be hidden as well as whether or not the murderer and the 
victim crossed paths. This is just a small sample of the data present on a cell phone - the wide 
variety of apps and services available can lead to many types of evidence. Some phones, for 
example, record the location and time the flashlight was turned on, which can also help in 
locating a body. 
Social media is also used heavily by law enforcement. The types of evidence that can be 
found in social media often overlap with the cell phone data. However, social media is not 
always directly connected to the phone. 
Cameras, especially surveillance cameras, are a huge opportunity for law enforcement as 
well. Both commercial security cameras and home security cameras, such as the camera 
installed on the Ring doorbell, can be used to identify suspects and provide evidence. These 
cameras can often be used to track suspects and determine the route they took through an area. 
Some agencies, for example, will canvas a neighborhood and look for Ring doorbell cameras, 
Google Hub, and Google Home devices if they are searching for a fleeing suspect. Agencies can 
do the same with commercial surveillance cameras. 
Routers are also an invaluable tool for law enforcement, especially in determining 
whether or not a person was present at the site. Modem and router pings, for example, can be 
matched to a phone to determine if the suspect passed through the area. If the suspect has a 
relation to the victim, it is possible that the suspect’s devices connected to the router, and may 
provide evidence that puts the suspect with the victim at the time of the crime. 
Other devices mentioned included smartwatches, such as the Fitbit, and devices that can 
give biometric data to the investigators. However, these devices had not been used in this 
capacity by the interviewees. 
It is important to note that many of the interviewees expressed in some form the idea that 
crime is moving toward the digital realm, and that digital evidence is likely to be increasing. 
Many crimes, like financial crimes, are moving online, and the current move towards a 
“Surveillance Culture” is likely to increase the amount of digital evidence as well. Finally, the 
growing capacity of devices to store information will make them more and more likely to contain 
evidence for a crime. 
Overall, both the literature and the interviews agree that digital and IoT evidence is on the 
rise. However, although IoT evidence is used in criminal investigations, cell phone evidence is 
likely to remain the focus for many agencies as cell phones are both more common and more 
versatile. Despite this, there are still a huge amount of opportunities in IoT evidence, and law 
enforcement agencies are aware of many of them. 
One of the major themes is that all criminal activities produce some form of digital 
evidence. With this in mind, officers can look for IoT devices, determine possible evidence 
stored on them, and use that evidence if it is there to build their cases. It is important to be 
knowledgeable on the potential opportunities, as well as the types and capabilities of IoT 




RSQ2: How can law enforcement officers better understand the legal challenges associated with 
using IoT evidence? 
 
 
Despite the huge opportunities in digital and IoT evidence, there are an equally huge 
number of legal challenges standing in the way of general use of IoT and digital evidence. These 
include issues with the evidence chain for digital and IoT evidence, legal issues with storing and 
processing the evidence in house, difficulty getting evidence from third party companies and 
even the confiscated devices themselves, and problems at trial. There are some legal issues 
identified in the literature that are not present in the field - at least not yet, anyway. 
Before studying the legal issues discovered in the interviews, it is important to confirm 
that digital and IoT evidence is useful at all in a legal sense. There are many cases that do not 
use digital evidence or IoT evidence at all. The reasons for this can range from lack of evidence 
for a search warrant for the devices to already having enough evidence to convict, making the 
digital evidence redundant. In the latter case, it is often not worth the hassle to get digital 
evidence. There are, however, many cases that use digital evidence. Some of these cases, 
especially cases that exist primarily in the digital realm, depend on digital evidence. Other cases 
use digital evidence as “another nail in the coffin” so to speak. Some digital evidence is “critical 
evidence”, and some, for example texts admitting guilt, can be “just as good as a confession”. 
Overall, the general feeling is that as long as digital evidence can be used to build a stronger 
case, it should be used if possible. 
Although digital evidence is useful, it is often difficult to utilize. One of the problems 
standing in the way of digital evidence is the additional complexity of the digital chain of 
evidence. Improper evidence chains will get evidence thrown out. Making sure that digital 
evidence is processed correctly is thus quite important. While not explicitly stated, the amount 
of time spent on this issue implies that improper processing of digital evidence happens often 
enough to be a problem. This can especially happen when evidence is sent to other agencies to 
process, either through the mishandling of the evidence by outside agencies or by the increased 
complexity of the chain caused by sending it out in the first place. Even when processed in 
house, many agencies lack a written procedure or process of analyzing the evidence. This can 
cause evidence chain issues as well. 
The very nature of the evidence itself can cause legal issues as well. Sensitive evidence, 
such as pornographic material, must be stored very carefully. If it is not, the agency itself could 
be guilty of breaking the law. Security of the evidence is an issue as well, as any internet 
connected computer is a potential weak point. 
Many devices do not store all of the data locally. Retrieving potential evidence from the 
offsite, especially from third party companies such as Apple, Google, Amazon, Facebook, 
Snapchat, and others can be very difficult. Many of the interviews pointed to issues getting 
information from these companies. The companies will often not be cooperative with subpoenas, 
either through challenging them legally or by making the process very difficult and time 
consuming. There are many steps involved, including a lot of paperwork that is difficult to 
complete to the satisfaction of the third party. This paperwork often changes, making things 
more difficult. Even when companies cooperate, the procedure still takes a large amount of time. 
In some cases, the companies have failed to produce the evidence asked for even after agreeing 
to the subpoena, which leads to further delays. All of this is compounded by the fact that many 
times, these subpoenas must be sent to multiple companies in multiple formats. The delays that 
these problems cause can sometimes cause courts to be skeptical of the data, as well. However, 
the above is not always true, and some companies are friendlier to law enforcement than others. 
Several respondents mentioned Facebook as fairly easy to get data from, for example. 
Law enforcement can run into problems getting data from the device itself as well. Some 
of this comes from a lack of suspicion of evidence on the device. Sometimes, this can be 
because witnesses or other interested parties don’t want to corroborate a statement that there is 
evidence on the device, leaving law enforcement with no grounds to confiscate the device. 
However, there is a counterpoint to this: If a suspect gives permission to search the device, the 
process of retrieving information can be much easier. 
The final legal challenge identified in the interviews were challenges in the trial phase. 
First is the problem that companies often always challenge digital evidence. While this is good 
from a privacy perspective, it makes things difficult for law enforcement. The defense often 
challenges all evidence as well, leading to the same issue. These are issues faced with all 
evidence, however. The second problem is that the court system, and the actors in it, are often 
older than the technology that creates the evidence is. One interviewee stated that the court 
system, which is based on 14th and 13th century ideas, often struggles to apply these ideas to 
21st century problems. The prosecutors and attorneys involved often struggle with digital 
evidence as well. While some prosecutors are very fluent in digital evidence, and actively work 
to promote it, others are much less fluent and will struggle with or refuse to use digital evidence 
because of this. In addition, there may not be time to explain the details of the digital and IoT 
evidence to the legal team, leading to the evidence struggling at trial. It is difficult to explain 
these concepts to the jury as well, which can lead to good evidence not being considered as well 
as it could have been. The third and final problem identified relates to the previous issues of 
evidence chain and third party providers. It can be necessary to have someone from the 
providing company acting as an expert witness, which can lead to additional subpoenas and 
delays. However, it is very important to note that the more involved and knowledgeable about 
digital evidence the legal teams were, the fewer legal problems they faced, both from other 
companies and in trial. 
The legal issues raised in the interview section differ significantly from the issues raised 
by the literature in one major respect: the issue of what evidence corresponds with the warrant. 
In the literature, there is a major issue with the warrant for a device not covering the actual 
evidence found in a device: for example, what does the investigator do if the investigator finds 
child pornography evidence when searching for GPS data for a murder. In practice, this is not an 
issue for the law enforcement agencies involved at all. The overall consensus was clearly that 
getting a search warrants would cover this situation, either because the warrant was broad 
enough in the first place or because the investigator could simply back out and get another 
warrant for the new evidence. This is the same method often used when finding unrelated 
evidence when searching a house. One interviewee did make the observation that this was likely 
to change in the future, but the law hasn’t quite caught up to the breadth of information 
potentially available on devices. Overall, for the moment, this particular scenario hasn’t been an 
issue. 
In conclusion, there are a number of legal challenges involved with digital and IoT 
evidence. Many of these are the same as with normal evidence, but are simply more 
complicated. Understanding the details of the evidence and being able to explain these to a legal 
team, as well as understanding the procedures needed to subpoena evidence, is key. However, 
officers should keep abreast of any court cases involving digital evidence, as those cases could 





RSQ3: How can law enforcement officers better understand the operational challenges with 
using IoT evidence and other digital forensics? 
 
 
Another roadblock in the way of digital and IoT evidence is the number of operational 
challenges faced by agencies when dealing with these types of evidence. These challenges 
include funding, manpower, training, turnaround times, and the sheer amount of evidence that is 
produced by digital devices. 
Every interviewee expressed in some form the desire to process all digital evidence in 
house, and the agencies that did showed significant reduction in the operational challenges faced. 
Some benefits of in house processing included knowledgeable investigators and legal teams, 
quick and effective low level processing, and for larger agencies, access to specialists for tougher 
problems. Finally, even if an agency processing information in house, they still have the option 
to send the evidence out. For those agencies that were not able to process in house, they 
identified a number of reasons as to why they were not able to. The main challenge is that 
equipment for processing digital evidence is very expensive, as is the training necessary to use 
the equipment. Even the non-specialized equipment takes a significant amount of resources, as 
even regular computers must have high performance processors and good security on order to 
hold and process the data received. A lack of infrastructure for storing digital evidence causes 
problems as well. Training is also needed, and can be difficult to find or afford. A lack of 
experience in digital evidence was identified as standing in the way of effective in house 
processing as well. Overall, though, the main roadblock for processing information in house is 
funding. 
Fortunately, there are a number of resources available to agencies for processing digital 
evidence. These include the Arkansas state crime lab, the FBI, the Secret Service, and even the 
Walmart forensics lab in Bentonville. Cities often will help other cities out with digital 
processing as well. Many times, these services are offered for free. Many of these services are 
quick as well. 
Unfortunately, sending evidence out has its own problems. The Arkansas state crime lab 
is very slow with a large backlog, and can take up to a year to process a cell phone. Another 
agency might not be able to process evidence quickly because of their own cases, and thus are 
not always able to expedite processing of the evidence sent to them. Again, although the 
interviewees were appreciative of the different options available, every interviewee would rather 
not have to send evidence out to another agency to process. 
Regardless of whether or not agencies sent out evidence or processed it in hose, there 
were a number of problems faced generally. One of the problems faced is again the number of 
places evidence needed to be requested from, as well as the paperwork needed to make this and 
other digital and IoT evidence procedures happen. Subpoenas taking a long time is an issue as 
well. Another problem faced is that even in agencies with a lot of resources and knowledge, the 
encryptions still outpace the technology on occasion. However, the main issue mentioned by a 
number of interviewees is the sheer amount of data that can be taken from each device. There is 
a lot of evidence to sort through and this takes time and money. Compounding this is the 
problem that companies will often give too much information in response to a subpoena. The 
prevalence of devices and evidence is an issue as well. The problems arising from the amount of 
data manifest in other ways than just time to sort thought it. One interviewee noted that his 
agency was running into issues where the computers they were using were not able to handle the 
amount of evidence given well enough to look through it manually. 
Fortunately, the operational challenges noticed seemed to be lessening for each agency 
over time. More training and resources are becoming available, and the virtualization of many 
training workshops makes it easier for officers to get training in, often for free. In addition, more 
and more agencies are increasing their ability to process evidence themselves. 
One issue identified in the literature that was not brought up in the interviews was the 
problem of jurisdictional boundaries. While subpoenaing companies was an issue, there did not 
seem to be any issues with the authority of an agency to issue subpoenas to another state. 
In conclusion, the main limitation in using IoT evidence from an operational standpoint is 
the ability of the department to process information in house. By increasing training and 
knowledge, as well as acquiring equipment to process evidence locally, the department can avoid 
a number of the issues present with evidence. However, it is important to understand that the 
amount of data produced will only become a larger, and that the world of digital evidence is 







There are several major limitations to this study. The first is the relatively narrow pool in 
interviewees who responded to the study. Several interviewees were from the same agency, 
which limits the breadth of the study and introduces the potential for evidence points to be 
overrepresented compared to a wider sample. In addition, every interviewee was from the state 
of Arkansas. Other states may have different situations that will affect their usage of digital 
evidence - for example, population density, education levels, and average income of a state could 
affect the results found. A related limitation is the financial status and urbanization levels of the 
state, as IoT devices may not be found in the same frequency in rural or lower income 
communities than in urban and higher income communities. Furthermore, many of the responses 
in interviews concerned cell devices as well as IoT devices. While smartphones are technically 
IoT devices, they are not the focus of this study, and may dilute the results and introduce 
methods of using IoT evidence that may not work when considering non-cellular IoT devices. 
Finally, Covid-19 may have impacted the study as well, as lockdowns may have impacted the 
kinds of crimes departments are pursuing as well as the ability of departments to mitigate some 
of the roadblocks found in the study. 
 
 




There are a number of opportunities for further research in this topic. First of all, this 
research could be continued in different states or nationally. This could allow a researcher to 
determine if challenges in IoT are similar across state lines and for the nation overall, and where 
IoT evidence is more likely to be found. Studies could focus on urban and rural areas as well. A 
focus on urban versus rural areas could determine if IoT evidence is more prevalent in one 
setting or the other, as well as determining if the ability of agencies to process evidence changes 
based on the urbanization of their jurisdiction. An additional expansion of this research could 
focus on determining what IoT devices investigators know to look for, and whether or not 
education in IoT and digital evidence as well as or the age of the investigators play a role. 
Analyzing the percentage of IoT cases compared to agency budget would allow researchers to 
determine how strongly funding impacts the ability and willingness of an agency to pursue 
digital evidence. Finally, there is potential in research investigating how many agencies perform 
in house digital evidence processing, and whether or not that affects the knowledge about digital 
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